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On the morning of August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made 
landfall on the southeastern tip of Louisiana. By the end of its wave 
of destruction, more than 1,800 people were dead and an untold 
number of homes, well into the thousands, were destroyed.1 The 
federal government, through its Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), offered relief by providing $2.7 billion worth of 
emergency housing units (EHUs or trailers) to those in need of 
shelter,2 including New Orleans resident Alana Alexander and her 
son Christopher Cooper.3 In May of 2006, Alexander and Cooper 
moved into a FEMA trailer.4 Upon moving into the EHU, Alexander 
noticed a “chemical smell” and “experienced eye and throat 
irritation.”5 At the time, an unidentified FEMA representative or 
contractor told Alexander that there was “nothing to worry about.”6 
Relying on this statement, Alexander took no action regarding her 
concerns over the trailer’s safety until December 2007 when she 
                                                                                                                 
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2013, Georgia State University College of Law. 
 1. RICHARD D. KNABB, JAMIE R. RHOME & DANIEL P. BROWN, NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., 
TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT HURRICANE KATRINA: 23–30 AUGUST 2005 11–12 (2011) (“The extent, 
magnitude, and impacts of the damage caused by Katrina are staggering . . . .”). 
 2. Bruce Watson, The Awful Odyssey of FEMA’s Hurricane Katrina Trailers, DAILY FIN. (Sept. 28, 
2010, 10:15 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/08/28/the-awful-odyssey-of-femas-hurricane-
katrina-trailers. 
 3. In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig., 646 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Original Brief for Appellant at 4 FEMA Trailer Litig., 646 F.3d 185 (No. 10–30451), 2010 WL 
7540365 at *4. 
 6. Id. at 4–5. But see Brief for Appellee at 37 FEMA Trailer Litig., 646 F.3d 185 (No. 10–30451), 
2010 WL 4619550 at *37 (challenging the assertion that the unidentified individual actually worked for 
the United States). 
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learned, via news reports, of the link between FEMA trailers and 
formaldehyde contamination.7 Alexander, on behalf of Cooper, 
subsequently filed an administrative claim with FEMA as required 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).8 After waiting seven 
months and receiving no response to her administrative claim, she 
filed an action against the United States in the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana.9 
The district court dismissed Alexander’s claim for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction, holding that Alexander failed to file her 
administrative claim with FEMA within the two-year statute of 
limitations prescribed by the FTCA.10 On appeal Alexander argued, 
inter alia, that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled 
because of the false information given to her by the “government 
representative.”11 The Fifth Circuit denied Alexander’s equitable 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Original Brief for Appellant, supra note 5 at 4. For articles revealing the possible contamination 
of FEMA trailers around December 2007, see David Hammer, FEMA Trailers to be Tested for 
Formaldehyde, NEW ORLEANS TIMES–PICAYUNE, Dec. 13, 2007, http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/ 
2007/12/fema_trailers_to_be_tested_for.html; Michael Kunzelman, Amid Health Concerns, FEMA Bars 
Workers From Stored Trailers, SOUTHEAST MISSOURIAN, Nov. 9, 2007, 
http://www.semissourian.com/story/1289822.html. 
 8. The statute of limitations for the FTCA requires claimants to first present the claim to the 
“appropriate Federal agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2006). After denial of the claim by the 
administrative agency, the claimant has six months in which to present a claim to the appropriate court. 
Id. § 2401(b). If the administrative agency fails to make a decision within six months of the filing by the 
claimant, the claimant may treat the failure to act as a denial for purposes of filing a claim in the courts. 
Id. § 2675(a). For a case involving the failure to meet the six-month, post-denial deadline see Hammond 
v. United States, 613 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Pa. 1985). 
 9. Alexander’s complaint alleged that the government acted with gross negligence and deliberate 
indifference to the health of her son by failing to disclose that the trailer they provided exposed him to 
high levels of toxic materials. FEMA Trailer Litig., 646 F.3d at 188.  
 10. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (“A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is 
presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues.”). A 
claim arising under the FTCA accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury 
which is the basis of” his claim. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 162 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 589–90 (5th Cir. 1999)). The district court held that 
Alexander’s claim accrued in May 2006 when she moved into the EHU, thus filing her administrative 
claim in July 2008 was untimely. In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 07–
1873, 2009 WL 2599195, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 2009), aff’d 646 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 11. FEMA Trailer Litig., 646 F.3d at 190; see sources cited supra note 6. Equitable tolling is a 
doctrine that allows a court to hear a plaintiff’s claim even after the passing of the statute of limitations. 
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133 (2008) (“[Statutes of limitation] 
typically permit courts to toll the limitations period in light of special equitable considerations.” (citing 
Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 560–61 (2000); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 
(1982); Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450–53 (7th Cir. 1990))); Chao v. Russell P. Le 
Frois Builder, Inc., 291 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Equitable tolling is a doctrine that permits courts 
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tolling argument on the grounds that statutes waiving sovereign 
immunity, such as the FTCA, are to be strictly construed and a court 
sitting in equity cannot “extend the waiver beyond that which 
Congress intended.”12 Unfortunately, if an opportunity existed for 
Alexander to bring her claim in another circuit, it is possible that, 
applying the same federal law13—the FTCA statute of limitations—
that court would have adopted her equitable tolling argument and 
reached the merits of her case.14 
Among the circuits that have considered equitably tolling the 
statute of limitations under the FTCA, the Third and Eighth Circuits 
have allowed the statute to be tolled, whereas the Ninth and Fifth 
Circuits have not.15 This split stems from the Supreme Court’s 
inconsistent application of equitable tolling to waivers of sovereign 
immunity generally.16 This Note focuses on equitable tolling of the 
FTCA statute of limitations specifically, while acknowledging that 
the doctrine applies to all waivers of sovereign immunity alike. Part I 
discusses a line of Supreme Court cases addressing tolling statutes of 
limitations for various causes of action against the government.17 As 
                                                                                                                 
to extend a statute of limitations on a case-by-case basis to prevent inequity.” (quoting Warren v. 
Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000))); see also Ellis v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 
703, 706 (11th Cir. 1998) (defining equitable tolling as a “doctrine under which plaintiffs may sue after 
the statutory time period has expired if they have been prevented from doing so due to inequitable 
circumstances”). 
 12. FEMA Trailer Litig., 646 F.3d at 190 (quoting Ramming, 281 F.3d at 165). 
 13. Gould v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 738, 742 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Although 
FTCA liability is determined ‘in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission 
occurred,’ 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), federal law determines when a claim accrues.” (emphasis added) 
(quoting Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1980))). 
 14. See Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[E]quitable tolling 
is possible under the FTCA . . . .”); see also T.L. ex rel. Ingram v. United States, 443 F.3d 956, 961 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (“[E]quitable tolling applies in FTCA cases only because Congress intended it to apply.” 
(citing United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 353–54 (1997))). 
 15. Compare Santos, 559 F.3d at 194–97, and Ingram, 443 F.3d at 963, with Marley v. United 
States, 548 F.3d 1286, 1288–93 (9th Cir. 2008), and Ramming, 281 F.3d at 163–66. 
 16. Compare Irwin v. Dep’t. of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990) (“[T]he same rebuttable 
presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits 
against the United States.”), with Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. at 137 (holding that when the Court has 
already prescribed a definitive interpretation of a certain statute of limitations, that interpretation is 
binding regardless of equitable principles); see also Santos, 559 F.3d at 196 (finding the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Sand & Gravel “might call into question whether equitable tolling is available in 
FTCA claims”). 
 17. See discussion infra Part I. 
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Part I illustrates, the Court eventually found that lower courts should 
presume that they may equitably toll waivers of sovereign 
immunity,18 allowing them to rebut the presumption if precedent 
establishes that the statutory time period in question is a restriction 
on the court’s jurisdiction.19 Part II uses the FTCA as a model for 
analyzing the problem of applying precedent to rebut the 
presumption—namely, which courts’ precedent to apply.20 Finally, 
Part III proposes that the Supreme Court limit the grounds for 
rebutting the presumption of equitable tolling to the express language 
of the statute or a prior definitive determination of the statute as 
jurisdictional by the Court.21 
I. TOLLING CLAIMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 
A. The Traditional Approach To Equitably Tolling Waivers Of 
Sovereign Immunity 
The United States Supreme Court first addressed equitably 
extending a statute of limitations for a claim against the government 
in Kendall v. United States.22 In Kendall, the plaintiff brought suit 
against the government in the Court of Claims.23 The Court of Claims 
is forever barred from hearing claims filed six years from their date 
of accrual, save in cases when a person is disabled or “beyond the 
seas.”24 Even though his claim accrued in December 1865 and he 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Id.; Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95. 
 19. Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. at 138. 
 20. See discussion infra Part II. The FTCA serves as an excellent model for highlighting the current 
doctrinal problem because circuits are applying their own precedent to define the FTCA’s statute of 
limitations, leading to inconsistent application of the FTCA. Compare Santos, 559 F.3d 189, and 
Ingram, 443 F.3d 956, with Marley, 548 F.3d 1286, and Ramming, 281 F.3d 158. 
 21. See discussion infra Part III. 
 22. Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123 (1883). 
 23. Kendall, 107 U.S. at 124. The United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over claims 
arising under the Constitution, laws of the United States, or express or implied contracts with the United 
States, brought against the federal government. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006). 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 2501. To qualify for a legal disability under the Court of Claims statute of 
limitations a plaintiff must show that he had either a mental or physical condition that rendered him 
“incapable of caring for his property . . . of understanding the nature and effect of his acts, and of 
comprehending his legal rights and liabilities.” Waldorf v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 321, 324 (Cl. Ct. 
1985) (quoting Goewey v. United States, 612 F.2d 539, 544–45 (Ct. Cl. 1979)); see also Sand & Gravel, 
552 U.S. at 135–36 (discussing the relatively minor language changes from the original Court of Claims 
4
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filed suit nearly seven years later in November 1872, the plaintiff in 
Kendall—who had been a member of the Confederate Army—argued 
that the limitations period should be extended because he could not 
invoke the court’s jurisdiction until the amnesty proclamation of 
December 25, 1868.25 The Court rejected this contention.26 
Beginning from the premise that a citizen cannot sue the sovereign 
unless the same has consented to the suit,27 the Court reasoned that 
the government could circumscribe its consent.28 The Court then 
found that, just like Congress limited the Court of Claims’ 
jurisdiction to the types of claims enumerated in the statute, Congress 
also limited the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction to claims filed within 
six years of their accrual date.29 The Court thus could not extend the 
time period for bringing a claim in the Court of Claims—just as it 
could not add substantive claims to the Court of Claims’ 
jurisdiction—without circumventing the express will of Congress, 
something it was clearly not willing to do.30 
                                                                                                                 
legislation to the current legislation and concluding that the changes are insignificant). 
 25. Kendall, 107 U.S. at 124–25. The amnesty proclamation of December 25, 1868 grants: “To all 
and every person who directly or indirectly participated in the late insurrection or rebellion, a full 
pardon and amnesty for the offence of treason against the United States . . . with restoration of all rights, 
privileges, and immunities.” Presidential Proclamation, Full Pardon and Amnesty Granted to all Persons 
Engaged in the Late-Rebellion, 15 Stat. 711 (1869). 
 26. Kendall, 107 U.S. at 125. 
 27. The Supreme Court of the United States adopted the doctrine of sovereign immunity early in its 
jurisprudence. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 411–12 (1821) (“The universally 
received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United States . . . .”). The 
Supreme Court also established early on that Congress alone had the power to waive the sovereign 
immunity of the United States. United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 443 (1834) (“As the United 
States are not suable of common right, the party who institutes a suit against them must bring his case 
within the authority of some act of [C]ongress, or the court cannot exercise jurisdiction.”). These 
principles are alive and well today. See generally Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481 (2006); 
Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273 (1983). Moreover, the Court 
traditionally expressed that the government’s consent to be sued must be unambiguous and may not be 
implied. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 
(1969). 
 28. Kendall, 107 U.S. at 125 (“[The government] may restrict the jurisdiction of the [C]ourt of 
[C]laims to certain classes of demands.”). 
 29. Id. (“The [Court of Claims enacting statute] contain[s] restrictions which that court may not 
disregard. . . . To that class may be referred claims which are declared barred if not asserted within the 
time limited by the statute.”). 
 30. Id. at 125–26. 
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The Supreme Court analyzed this jurisdictional principle again in 
Finn v. United States.31 In Finn, the Court recognized the Court of 
Claims’ power to raise the limitations issue sua sponte.32 The Court 
distinguished between an ordinary limitations argument, which “does 
not operate by its own force,” and congressionally-defined 
limitations on the boundaries of sovereign liability.33 Relying on the 
consensual nature of claims against the government, the Court again 
found the Court of Claims powerless to adjudicate when a petitioner 
filed a claim more than six years after it accrued.34 
Taken together, Kendall and Finn frame the statutes of limitation 
on claims against the government as jurisdictional in nature.35 The 
ruling in Soriano v. United States carried this approach into the 
twentieth century.36 In Soriano, the Court considered whether a 
breach of contract claim in the Court of Claims could be equitably 
tolled due to Japanese occupation of the Philippines in World War 
II.37 The Court strictly adhered to precedent38 and found that it was 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Finn dealt with a contract claim asserted against the United States and thus invoked the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims once again. Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 (1887). 
 32. Id. at 232–33. 
 33. For non-government defendants, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that will be 
waived if not raised in the pleadings. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). The government’s liability, however, 
arises solely from an act of Congress, and a court cannot alter or ignore the congressional enactment, 
including the statute of limitations. Finn, 123 U.S. at 232. Thus, a court should raise the statute of 
limitations issue on its own in any case involving government liability. Id. at 232–33. 
 34. Finn, 123 U.S. at 232–33. 
 35. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 134–36 (2008) (discussing how 
Kendall and Finn established the view that the statute of limitations for claims in the Court of Claims is 
jurisdictional); Blueport Co., L.L.P. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 702, 715 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (“This strict 
rule that conditions (or as the Kendall Court termed it, ‘restrictions’) to waivers of sovereign immunity 
are limitations on jurisdiction was the law for the remainder of the Nineteenth Century, and indeed for 
almost all of the Twentieth.” (citing United States v. Wardwell, 172 U.S. 48 (1898))), aff’d sub nom. 
Blueport Co., L.L.C. v. United States, 533 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Hardin v. City Title & Escrow 
Co., 797 F.2d 1037, 1040 (D.C. Cir.1986) (citing Finn for the rule that “[j]urisdictional provisions in 
federal statutes are to be strictly construed”). 
 36. Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 274 (1957). Cf. Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 495–98 
(1967) (finding that the text of the Trading with the Enemy Act evinced congressional intent to allow 
the tolling of the sixty-day statute of limitations for claims brought against the government under said 
Act). 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–44 (2006). 
 37. Soriano, 352 U.S. at 270–71. Soriano brought a takings claim for foodstuffs and other supplies 
that he furnished to Philippine guerilla forces during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during 
World War II. Id. The Court stated that the merit of his claim depended on the ability to classify the 
Philippine guerilla forces as “a unit operating in the service of the United States.” Id. at 271.The Court 
never reached that issue, however, due to the statute of limitations problem. Id. 
 38. The Court began by thoroughly discussing Kendall and quoting from it the proposition that 
6
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not permitted to equitably toll the Court of Claims statute of 
limitations.39 The Court relied on two propositions to come to this 
conclusion. First, statutes of limitations covering waivers of 
sovereign immunity are absolute; meaning courts may not expand the 
limitation period beyond that established by Congress.40 Second, the 
Court found that the express language of the Court of Claims statute, 
in particular, did not authorize extension of the limitation.41 The 
Court thus reinforced the notion that courts must “strictly observe” 
the language of any statute waiving sovereign immunity.42 
In 1967, the Supreme Court notably departed from its usual 
approach of dismissing tolling arguments when it found that the 
language of a certain statute implicitly allowed for claims against the 
government even after the expiration of the statute’s limitations 
period.43 The statute at issue in Honda v. Clark was a sixty-day filing 
deadline for persons claiming an interest in property held by the 
Alien Property Custodian pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy 
Act (TWEA) of 1917.44 Petitioners were a class of Asian Americans 
whose assets the United States seized after the commencement of 
WWII.45 The TWEA provided the government with a mechanism for 
returning Petitioner’s assets after the war ceased.46 Congress based 
the procedure almost entirely on the system used in the Bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                 
“‘[t]he court cannot superadd to [the statutorily enumerated circumstances in which tolling the limitation 
is proper]’ . . . having ‘no more authority to ingraft (another) disability arising upon the 
statute . . . which might prevent a claimant from suing within the time prescribed.’” Id. at 273–74 
(emphasis added). 
 39. Id. at 275–77. 
 40. Id. at 276 (“Limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be 
strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.” (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 
U.S. 584, 590–91 (1941))). 
 41. Id. at 276 (“Congress was entitled to assume that the limitation period [set forth in the Court of 
Claims statute] . . . meant just that period and no more.”). The Court of Claims statute of limitations 
states in its entirety, save a few enumerated exceptions, “[e]very claim of which the United States Court 
of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years 
after such claim first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006). 
 42. Soriano, 352 U.S. at 276. 
 43. Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484 (1967). 
 44. Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA) of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. § 1 (2006). The filing deadline 
requires claimants to file a petition with the district court within sixty days of denial of their 
administrative claim. Id. § 9(a). 
 45. Honda, 386 U.S. at 486–87. 
 46. 50 U.S.C. app. § 9. 
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Act for the distribution of assets to creditors.47 Drawing on 
bankruptcy case law, the Court determined that Congress included 
the sixty-day limitation in order to provide for fair and timely 
distribution of assets, and not for the purpose of protecting the 
government.48 Tolling the limitation, therefore, provided substantial 
benefits and minimal harm while maintaining the intent of 
Congress.49 Thus, the Court found that the limitation could be tolled 
even though nothing in the TWEA statute expressly granted that 
power to the courts.50 
Twenty years later in Bowen v. City of New York,51 the Court 
considered tolling the Social Security Act’s52 sixty-day limitation for 
filing claims after receiving notice of final administrative denial.53 
The language of the statute controlled the Court’s analysis.54 Like the 
Honda Court, the Bowen Court noted the importance of not abating 
the waiver of sovereign immunity that Congress intended.55 Two 
years prior the Court defined the Social Security Act as “unusually 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Honda, 386 U.S. at 495 & n.11. 
 48. Congress’s deriving the TWEA re-distribution process from the Bankruptcy Act heavily 
persuaded the Court and a 1938 amendment that granted creditors an avenue of relief even though their 
claims were tardy carried particular weight. Chandler Act (Bankruptcy Revision) of June 22, 1938, ch. 
575, 52 Stat.840 (repealed 1979). The Court noted how this amendment merely codified the equitable 
principle that statutes of limitations are for the benefit of the creditors, not the debtors, which 
bankruptcy courts previously applied regardless of statutory authorization. Honda, 386 U.S. at 496–98. 
Accordingly, the principles that allowed a statute of limitations to be tolled in a bankruptcy case 
“applied to the [TWEA statute of limitations] with equal force.” Id. at 498. 
 49. Honda, 386 U.S. at 497–500. 
 50. After Honda, the Court placed itself in the position of having to analyze each particular statute 
waiving sovereign immunity in order to determine if Congress intended to allow tolling of the 
limitations period. Id. at 484; 50 U.S.C. app. § 9. 
 51. The issue presented in Bowen was whether, in certifying a class claiming a violation of § 405(g) 
of the Social Security Act, the district court properly included members who failed to file their claims 
within sixty days of a final decision from the Secretary. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 
(1986). 
 52. Social Security Act (Old Age Pension Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 to 434 (2006). 
 53. Id. § 405(g). 
 54. The Bowen Court expressly stated that the case turned on whether Congress intended to allow 
tolling of the administrative filing deadline when it enacted the Social Security Act. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 
480. 
 55. Id. at 479. The Court again acknowledged that there may be statutes waiving sovereign 
immunity where Congress implicitly intended to allow the statute to be tolled and, by applying a per se 
denial of equitable tolling in such situations, courts might erroneously contravene congressional intent. 
Id. 
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protective”56 of claimants based on the thorough administrative 
procedure provided under the Act.57 Moreover, the Act empowers the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare58 to toll any limitations 
on administrative claims.59 This express language and policy of the 
Act, the Court concluded, revealed that persuasive equitable 
circumstances may arise where judicial tolling of the limitations 
period would stay within the overall congressional purpose of the 
statute.60 Unlike the TWEA statute in Honda, the Social Security Act 
expressly provided for tolling of the limitation—albeit by the 
Secretary and not the courts. The Court felt more comfortable 
exercising its equitable power; nevertheless, it once again tolled a 
statute of limitations waiving sovereign immunity without the 
express authority of Congress.61 
B. The Presumption Of Equitable Tolling Under Irwin v. Department 
Of Veteran Affairs 
In Irwin v. Department of Veteran Affairs, the Court abandoned 
the traditional approach of waiving statutes of limitations in suits 
against the government based solely on statutory construction and 
created a presumption in favor of applying equitable tolling to 
waivers of sovereign immunity.62 The Irwin Court considered a 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 106 (1984). 
 57. The administrative remedies under the Social Security Act consist of a preliminary decision on 
an applicant’s claim by a state agency followed by a de novo review of that decision by a different unit 
of that same state agency or the Commissioner of Social Security. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(2)(C). Thereafter, 
if still dissatisfied, the applicant is permitted a full evidentiary hearing and de novo review before an 
administrative law judge. Id. § (c)(7). Finally, one must file a petition with the Appeals Council of 
Health and Human Services and receive denial to exhaust his administrative options. Id. § (c)(9); 
Heckler, 467 U.S. at 107. 
 58. This position is now known as the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Times Topics, 
Health and Human Services Department, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/times 
topics/organizations/h/health_and_human_services_department/index.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). 
 59. See Good Cause for Missing the Deadline to Request Review, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.911, 416.1411 
(2012). 
 60. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 480.   
 61. Bowen was a product of the ad hoc approach set up by the Court after Honda. See id. at 479–80. 
 62. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990). “The Court . . . holds that . . . limitations 
periods for suits against the Government will now presumptively be subject to equitable tolling.” Id. at 
97 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). “[This] holding . . . reverses at least 
one of this Court’s prior decisions and is in tension with several others.” Id. at 97. 
9
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private right-to-action deadline in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.63 At 
the time, the Civil Rights Act required federal employees to file a 
petition for judicial review of their administrative complaint within 
thirty days of notice of final action taken by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).64 Petitioner claimed that even 
though he filed his petition forty-four days after receiving notice, his 
claim should nonetheless be heard.65 He argued the administrative 
deadline could be equitably tolled because his attorney was out of the 
country when the Court deemed him to have received notice.66 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address inconsistencies in the 
applicability of equitable tolling to waivers of sovereign immunity.67 
The Irwin Court held that equitably tolling a statute of limitations 
on suits against the government does not extend the waiver of 
sovereign immunity beyond the intention of Congress.68 The Court 
thereby extended “the same rebuttable presumption of equitable 
tolling applicable to suits against private defendants” to suits against 
the government.69 Surprisingly, the Court made this decision without 
expressly overturning any precedent, such as Soriano.70 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 91–92; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975 to 1975f, 1981 to 2000h-
6 (2006). The complaint in Irwin alleged race and physical disability discrimination on the part of the 
Department of Veterans Affairs when it terminated Shirley Irwin. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 90–91. 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16(c) (1988) (amended 1991); Current law allows for ninety days within 
which to file a petition. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16(c) (2006). 
 65. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 91. 
 66. The Fifth Circuit found that notice served to the administrative petitioner’s attorney and 
acknowledged by someone in that office, not necessarily the attorney personally, sufficed as proper 
notice to the petitioner. Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1989), aff’d sub nom. Irwin 
v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990). The Supreme Court accepted as valid the Fifth 
Circuit’s holding in this respect. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 93–94 (“To read the term ‘receipt’ to mean only 
‘actual receipt by the claimant’ would render the practice of notification through counsel a meaningless 
exercise. If Congress intends to depart from the common and established practice of providing 
notification through counsel, it must do so expressly.”) (citation omitted). 
 67. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 91 (“We granted certiorari to . . . resolve the Circuit conflict over whether 
late-filed claims are jurisdictionally barred.”). 
 68. Id. at 95 (“Once Congress has [waived its sovereign immunity], we think that making the rule of 
equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable to 
private suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver.”). 
 69. Id. at 95–96. The Court felt that treating the government like a private defendant more 
realistically portrayed Congress’s intent regarding tolling statutes of limitations. Id. at 96. The Court 
also believed that applying this presumption to private and government defendants alike created a more 
practically workable standard. Id. 
 70. Even though the Court rejected the ad hoc approach to interpreting congressional intent 
regarding tolling, the Court failed to expressly overrule Soriano. Id. at 96–97. Justice White focused on 
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unlike in Honda and Bowen, where the Court limited its holding to 
the particular statutes at issue, the Court in Irwin held that all waivers 
of sovereign immunity implicitly allow equitable tolling.71 
C. John R. Sand & Gravel v. United States 
In John R. Sand & Gravel v. United States (Sand & Gravel), the 
Court once again faced interpreting the statute of limitations set forth 
in the Court of Claims legislation.72 Although the Court established a 
trend of applying equitable tolling to claims against the government 
in Bowen and Irwin, the Sand & Gravel Court did not follow that 
trend, instead deferring to the Soriano rule that the Court of Claims’ 
time limitation is jurisdictional and cannot be extended by equitable 
considerations.73 In coming to this conclusion, the Court 
distinguished between statutes of limitations that were traditionally 
jurisdictional bars and those established for protecting case-specific 
parties from stale claims.74 The Court placed a burden on the 
petitioner to show that the precedent in Soriano was no longer good 
law.75 
                                                                                                                 
this contradiction in his concurrence. Id. at 97–100 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). While the Court does not extend a full discussion to Soriano, it implied that because the 
Court based its decision on congressional intent—albeit finding an intent to apply equitable tolling to all 
waivers of sovereign immunity, an interpretation new to the Court—it followed the holding in Soriano, 
and thus, no need existed to overturn it. Id. at 94–96 (majority opinion). By not overruling Soriano and 
its predecessors, however, the Court left open the question of whether the presumption of equitable 
tolling applied to those statues that the Court previously defined as jurisdictional. See id. at 94. 
 71. Compare Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 480 (1986) (concluding that application of 
equitable tolling to the limitation requirement found in the Social Security Act is consistent with 
congressional intent), with Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96–97 (holding that the doctrine of equitable tolling as 
applicable to suits against the Government is consistent with congressional intent). 
 72. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 132 (2008). The statute of limitations 
for the Court of Claims was also the statute at issue in Kendall, Finn, and Soriano. Soriano v. United 
States, 352 U.S. 270 (1957); Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 (1887); Kendall v. United States, 107 
U.S. 123 (1883). 
 73. The Court recognized Irwin in stating, “it is true . . . we adopted ‘a more general rule’ to replace 
our prior ad hoc approach.” Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. at 137 (quoting Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95). 
Nevertheless, the Court stuck to its holdings in Soriano and its predecessors regarding the Court of 
Claims statute specifically. Id. at 137–38. 
 74. The Court sets up this dichotomy to distinguish the present case from Irwin. Id. at 136–39. In 
Irwin, however, the Court stated that the rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling should apply to all 
suits against the government and never mentioned prior interpretations or characterizations of the 
statute. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95–96. 
 75. The burden placed on the petitioner was to show that after Irwin the Court of Claims limitation 
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Petitioner appropriately argued that Irwin overruled Soriano.76 The 
Court disagreed.77 Rather than deciding that Irwin overturned 
Soriano, the Court found that the Irwin presumption would be 
overcome for statutes where the Court previously interpreted the 
statute at issue as a jurisdictional bar.78 Thus, the definition of the 
Court of Claims’ statute as jurisdictional, established by Kendall and 
its progeny, rebutted the Irwin presumption of equitable tolling.79 
D. Summary Of Current Doctrine 
When deciding whether to equitably toll a statute of limitations in 
a suit against the government, lower courts apply the Irwin 
presumption allowing equitable tolling, but may rebut that 
presumption if precedent defines the statute of limitations at issue as 
jurisdictional.80 Problems arise in the analysis of specific waivers of 
sovereign immunity when Supreme Court precedent is imprecise81 
                                                                                                                 
was no longer a jurisdictional bar. Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. at 136. 
 76. Petitioner argued that Irwin required the Court to consider the equitable benefits of treating the 
government like a private defendant rather than adhering to traditional notions of waivers of sovereign 
immunity. Id. at 138. 
 77. Id. at 137. 
 78. Id. at 137–38. The Court reasoned that if statutory language could rebut the presumption of 
equitable tolling, so too could a “definitive earlier interpretation of the statute, finding a similar 
congressional intent.” Id. at 138. 
 79. Id. at 139. The Court emphasized that it was only ruling on the Court of Claims statute of 
limitations and heavily relied on stare decisis principles to maintain the definition of that statute as 
jurisdictional. Id. 
 80. Before Irwin, when a court considered tolling a waiver of sovereign immunity the conclusion 
turned on the ability of the court to extrapolate a congressional intention to allow tolling of the specific 
statute. See Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 500–01 (1967). The analysis was consequently ad hoc. See 
id. at 501. The Court in Irwin sought to abolish the ad hoc approach by applying the rebuttable 
presumption of equitable tolling to all statutes of limitations. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 
U.S. 89, 95 (1990). In Sand & Gravel the Court re-introduced the ad hoc approach by finding that 
statues that the Court previously found to not show congressional intent to allow tolling are to be treated 
as such regardless of the holding in Irwin. Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. 130. Thus, when applying the Irwin 
presumption, courts must again examine each statute to determine if it was traditionally defined as 
barring equitable considerations. See id. at 133–34. 
 81. In United States v. Kubrick, the Court addressed the issue of when a claim accrues under the 
FTCA. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117–18 (1979). The Court stated that it should make sure to neither 
“extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended,” nor “narrow the waiver that Congress 
intended.” Id. at 118. Courts interpreting the FTCA use this language from Kubrick to support both 
claims that the FTCA limitation is a jurisdictional bar and claims that the statute is susceptible to 
equitable tolling. Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009); Marley v. 
United States, 567 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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and circuits apply their own precedent defining the particular 
statute.82 Consequently, the same federal statute of limitations can 
lead to opposite results depending on the circuit in which the claim is 
brought. 
II. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AS A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS 
A. Supreme Court Interpretation Of The FTCA Statute Of Limitations 
The statute of limitations for the FTCA reads in its entirety: 
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred 
unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency 
within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is 
begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or 
registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the 
agency to which it was presented.83 
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the ability to equitably toll this 
statute. In United States v. Kubrick, the Court faced the issue of when 
an FTCA claim accrues.84 In discussing that issue the Court shed 
light on its understanding of the FTCA statute of limitations, 
§ 2401(b).85 The Kubrick Court stated that the “obvious purpose” of 
                                                                                                                 
 82. The Ninth Circuit, using the reasoning from Sand & Gravel, applied its own precedent to 
determine that the FTCA statute of limitations is jurisdictional. Marley, 567 F.3d at 1035–36. This may 
or may not be an appropriate reading of Sand & Gravel. See discussion infra Part III. The Eighth Circuit 
takes an interesting approach; it recently found that the FTCA statute is jurisdictional, yet may be 
equitably tolled. T.L. ex rel. Ingram v. United States, 443 F.3d 956, 961 (8th Cir. 2006). This also may 
or may not be appropriate adherence to Supreme Court precedent. See discussion infra Part III. 
 83. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2006). 
 84. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 116–17. The Court ultimately announced the “discovery rule” for claim 
accrual under the FTCA statute, which provides that a claim does not accrue until a plaintiff discovers 
he is injured as opposed to the traditional approach that the statute begins to run on the date of the 
injury. Id. at 122–25. The plaintiff argued that his claim should not accrue until he knew his doctor 
performed the procedure negligently. Id. at 119–20. The Court found this unpersuasive because the 
plaintiff was armed with the fact that he suffered an injury and should, therefore, have inquired into the 
negligence of his doctor. Id. at 122–25. The Court found that a two-year period to make such inquires 
sufficiently protected the plaintiff and to alter the accrual date any further would “undermine the 
purpose of the limitations statute.” Id. at 119–25. 
 85. The Court stated that “§ 2401(b) . . . is the balance struck by Congress in the context of tort 
claims against the Government; and we are not free to construe it so as to defeat its obvious purpose, 
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§ 2401(b) was to promote prompt presentation of claims.86 
Furthermore, because the FTCA waives sovereign immunity, the 
Court cautioned that it must not extend or narrow the extent of the 
limitation.87 Circuit courts cite to Kubrick to support both arguments 
for and against tolling § 2401(b).88 Due to the circuits’ split on 
Kubrick’s application to the issue of equitably tolling the FTCA 
limitation, and the Supreme Court’s failure to make an express ruling 
on the issue, circuits have taken various approaches to tolling 
§ 2401(b). 
B. Circuit Court Analysis Of § 2401(B) 
1. Pre-Irwin Interpretations 
Prior to Irwin, every circuit faced with the issue of equitably 
tolling claims under the FTCA considered the statute of limitations in 
§ 2401(b) a jurisdictional bar.89 For example, in Gonzalez-Bernal v. 
United States, the First Circuit strictly applied § 2401(b).90 The 
plaintiffs, a widow and her three children, filed an administrative 
claim for wrongful death with the Customs Service after their 
husband and father died, apparently while in the custody of two 
Customs agents.91 Plaintiffs filed an administrative claim after a 
federal grand jury indicted two customs agents on charges of murder 
                                                                                                                 
which is to encourage the prompt presentation of claims.” Id. at 117. This statement suggests that the 
FTCA statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional bar, but rather, like those in Honda and Bowen, was 
enacted merely to protect case-specific defendants from stale claims and thus is subject to equitable 
tolling. See discussion supra Part I.A; see also Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. at 134–37 (distinguishing 
between statutes of limitations that are primarily for the protection of the defendant against “unduly 
delayed claims” and those that act as jurisdictional bars in order to achieve broader goals such as 
limiting a waiver of sovereign immunity). 
 86. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117. 
 87. Id. at 118. 
 88. Compare Marley v. United States, 567 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing directly to 
Kubrick for the proposition that courts should not extend § 2401(b) beyond congressional intent and 
holding that § 2401(b) is not susceptible to equitable tolling), with Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States 
559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that a per se denial of equitable tolling of § 2401(b) would 
contravene Kubrick’s mandate not to narrow the waiver established by Congress). 
 89. Richard Parker, Is the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling Applicable to the Limitations Periods in the 
Federal Tort Claims Act?, MIL. L. REV., Winter 1992, at 1, 8 & n.47 (collecting cases). 
 90. Gonzalez-Bernal v. United States, 907 F.2d 246, 251 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 91. Id. at 247–48. 
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of the deceased.92 The Customs Service denied the claim on the 
grounds that it was not filed within two years of the date of accrual.93 
Regardless of the fact that the two Customs agents were convicted in 
federal court for the murder of the deceased—and thus were clearly 
liable as tortfeasors—the First Circuit found no basis in the language 
of § 2401(b) to extend or waive the limitations period.94 The court 
recognized the harshness of its holding—enforcing the limitations 
period even though the injured parties waited for the conclusion of a 
federal investigation of the matter—but nevertheless held that 
§ 2401(b) compelled it to strictly enforce the two-year limitation on 
filing administrative claims.95 
Furthermore, when specifically analyzing the legislative history of 
the FTCA limitation, courts routinely found no evidence of an intent 
to allow it to be equitably tolled.96 In the 1956 case of United States 
v. Glenn,97 the Ninth Circuit undertook a close examination of 
§ 2401(b) to determine whether its language allowed for equitable 
tolling.98 The trial court had held that the disabilities exceptions in 
§ 2401(a) applied to § 2401(b) and therefore the two-year limitation 
in § 2401(b) could be equitably tolled.99 The Ninth Circuit held an 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Id. at 248. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. The court simply stated that it was “well settled law” that a claim must be dismissed if not 
filed with the administrative agency within two years of accrual. Id. 
 95. Id. at 251 (“Although the district court’s decision seems harsh, it comports fully with the law and 
we hereby affirm.”). 
 96. See, e.g., United States v. Glenn ex rel. Glenn, 231 F.2d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 
352 U.S. 926 (1956). 
 97. Id. Michael Glenn was born December 5, 1949, in the Naval Air Station Hospital in Seattle, 
Washington. Id. at 885. At the time of his birth “[s]omeone was careless”; someone dropped Michael 
and he suffered head injuries that would persist for the rest of his life. Id. Four years later, Michael’s 
mother sued the United States, under the FTCA, on Michael’s behalf. Id. Due to lack of evidence on 
either side, the parties stipulated to a $7,500 settlement if the plaintiff could overcome the government’s 
statute of limitations defense. Id. 
 98. Id. at 885–86. The court’s analysis was in the vein of Bowen and Honda. See id. In other words, 
the court sought to determine whether the language of the FTCA evinced a congressional intent to allow 
tolling of the limitations period. Id. 
 99. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) is the statute of limitations for “every civil action commenced against the 
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2006). The last sentence of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) allows those 
suffering from a disability to file a claim within three years after the disability ceases. Id. 
Section 2401(b) is an exception to § 2401(a) that creates a different limitations period for “tort claim[s] 
against the United States.” Id. § 2401(b). The district court in Glenn found that the division of § 2401 
into subsections was merely a convenience for the reader and that the two subsections should be read 
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opposite opinion and reversed.100 The circuit court held that the 
arrangement of the statute, contrary to the district court holding, 
made it unclear whether the disability exception in subsection (a) 
applied to subsection (b); thus, a congressional intent inquiry was 
necessary and would control.101 The court found that the absence of 
any discussion by Congress on the applicability of the disability 
exception to subsection (b), coupled with a general lack of evidence 
of congressional intent to apply tolling doctrines to the FTCA, 
showed that Congress did not intend subsection (a)’s exception to 
apply to subsection (b).102 Thus, the court found—unlike the 
Supreme Court in Honda and Bowen did with the TWEA and Social 
Security Act, respectively—that the language of the FTCA did not 
allow for tolling of the limitations period.103 
The significance of Glenn lies in its relation to Honda and Bowen. 
All three courts considered tolling limitations in statutes waiving 
sovereign immunity.104 Furthermore, all three cases were decided 
under the traditional standard of strictly observing the language of the 
statute to discern whether to toll the limitations period.105 Glenn—
while not a Supreme Court decision—found compelling evidence of 
§ 2401(b) as a jurisdictional bar, as opposed to a limitation for the 
protection of case-specific parties such as the limitations at issue in 
Honda and Bowen.106 Of course, Glenn’s relevance would 
                                                                                                                 
together. Glenn ex rel. Glenn v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 914, 919 (S.D. Cal. 1955), rev’d, 231 F.2d 
884 (9th Cir. 1956). Furthermore, the court said that “the tolling provision [found in § 2401(a)] is by its 
terms unlimited in its application.” Id. Thus, the “equitable considerations” applicable to claims 
governed by § 2401(a) were also applicable to § 2401(b). Id. at 918–19. 
 100. Glenn, 231 F.2d at 886–87. The court felt that it had “no license” to take the exception of 
§ 2401(a) and apply it to § 2401(b). Id. at 886. Accordingly, it reversed the decision of the lower court. 
Id. at 887. 
 101. Id. at 886.   
 102. Id. The court believed that it was unable to comingle the subsections without evidence of such an 
intention from Congress. Id. Because Congress was silent on the issue, the court felt that the subsections 
must remain mutually exclusive. Id. 
 103. Id. at 887. 
 104. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 480 (1986); Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 500 
(1967); Glenn, 231 F.2d at 885. 
 105. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 480; Honda, 386 U.S. at 501; Glenn, 231 F.2d at 886–87. 
 106. The Ninth Circuit applied the same analysis to the FTCA that the Supreme Court employed in 
the analysis of the TWEA and Social Security Act. Compare Bowen, 476 U.S. at 479–82, and Honda, 
386 U.S. at 495–99, with Glenn, 231 F.2d at 885–87. The Ninth Circuit found that no congressional 
intent existed to hold that the FTCA limitation could be equitably tolled. Glenn, 231 F.2d at 886–87. 
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significantly decrease if a presumption in favor of tolling § 2401(b) 
existed that placed the burden on the defendant to show that 
Congress did not intend for courts to toll § 2401(b).107 
2. The Problem: Applying the Irwin Presumption and Sand & 
Gravel to § 2401(b) 
Schmidt v. United States is an excellent example of the 
fundamental effect Irwin had on a circuit court’s approach to statutes 
of limitations waiving sovereign immunity.108 The issue in Schmidt 
was whether the FTCA’s six-month limitation on administratively 
denied claims expired prior to the Schmidts filing their claim in the 
District Court for the District of Nebraska.109 The case turned on the 
plaintiff’s ability to prove the date on which the Federal Aviation 
Administration sent its letter of denial to the Schmidts—the date the 
statute of limitations began to run.110 Neither party could definitively 
prove when the FAA sent the letter.111 The district court held that 
§ 2401(b) was a jurisdictional bar to the court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction; therefore, the burden rested on the plaintiffs to show that 
they filed their claim within the requisite time period.112 Because 
they could not do so, the court dismissed their claim for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction.113 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the holding of the district 
court.114 Subsequently the Supreme Court decided Irwin, and the 
                                                                                                                 
Thus, when given the chance to align the FTCA with the TWEA and Social Security Act, the Ninth 
Circuit failed to do so. See id. The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari supplements the weight of the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding. Glenn ex rel. Glenn v. United States, 352 U.S. 926 (1956) (denying certiorari). 
 107. The Irwin presumption of the applicability of equitable tolling to statutes waiving sovereign 
immunity places the burden on the government to rebut the presumption. See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans 
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990); see also John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 
137–38 (2008) (“[T]he word ‘rebuttable’ means that the presumption is not conclusive.”). 
 108. Schmidt v. United States, 901 F.2d 680, 682 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated, 498 U.S. 1077 (1991), 
remanded to 933 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 109. See id. Section 2401(b) requires the claimant to file a judicial claim within six months of the date 
on which the administrative agency mailed, by registered mail, the letter denying the administrative 
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2006). 
 110. See Schmidt, 901 F.2d at 683. 
 111. Id. at 682. 
 112. Id. at 683. 
 113. Id. at 682. 
 114. Id. at 683. 
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Schmidts applied to the Supreme Court for certiorari.115 Rather than 
grant certiorari, the Court vacated the decision of the Eighth Circuit 
and remanded the case back to the circuit court for consideration in 
light of the holding in Irwin.116 
On remand, the Eighth Circuit outlined the implications the Irwin 
holding had on the FTCA statute of limitations.117 The court reasoned 
that because every statute waiving sovereign immunity was now 
presumptively subject to equitable tolling, and courts could never toll 
a limitation that was a restriction on their subject-matter jurisdiction, 
no statute waiving sovereign immunity was a jurisdictional bar.118 If 
the statute of limitations was not jurisdictional, it was merely an 
affirmative defense to be raised by the government-defendant.119 The 
Eighth Circuit thus abolished its definition of the FTCA statute of 
limitations as jurisdictional solely based on the Irwin presumption.120 
For the parties in Schmidt, the burden of proving the date on which 
the FAA sent the denial letter shifted to the FAA.121 The Third 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Schmidt v. United States 498 U.S. 1077, 1077 (1991) (vacating the decision of the Eighth Circuit 
and remanding the case for consideration in light of the holding in Irwin). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639, 640 (8th Cir. 1991). The major implication of Irwin, the 
court believed, was that statutes waiving sovereign immunity could in no case remain jurisdictional 
because of their susceptibility to equitable tolling. Id. 
 118. Id. Note that the Supreme Court does not follow this reasoning. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 137–38 (2008). The Supreme Court has held that a statute of limitations 
on a waiver of sovereign immunity may still be jurisdictional if the Irwin presumption is overcome by a 
prior definitive determination that the statute at issue is jurisdictional. Id. 
 119. Schmidt, 933 F.2d at 640. The statute of limitations for private defendants is an affirmative 
defense that the defendant must raise. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). In cases against the government, if the statute 
of limitations does not serve as a jurisdictional bar, it operates the same as it does for private defendants. 
Schmidt, 933 F.2d at 640. 
 120. See Schmidt, 933 F.2d at 640. The problem manifests itself when this holding is taken in 
conjunction with Sand & Gravel. Sand & Gravel holds that the Irwin presumption may be overcome by 
precedent defining the statute as jurisdictional. Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. at 137–38. The Eighth Circuit 
now has precedent that defines the FTCA statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, whereas other 
circuits have precedent defining the same federal statute as jurisdictional. Compare Schmidt, 933 F.2d at 
640, with McGraw v. United States, 281 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that § 2401(b) is a 
threshold jurisdictional issue), amended on denial of reh’g, 298 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 2002), and Ramming 
v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 165 (5th Cir. 2001). Consequently, the Eighth Circuit will allow 
equitable arguments for tolling the FTCA limitations while other circuits will not. The genesis of the 
problem, therefore, is that in the absence of Supreme Court precedent defining the FTCA limitations, 
courts, in the spirit of Sand & Gravel, apply their own conflicting precedents to the same federal statute. 
 121. Schmidt, 933 F.2d at 640. 
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Circuit followed the same path as the Eighth Circuit in concluding 
that it may toll the FTCA statute of limitations.122 
Conversely, some circuits hold that the FTCA limitations period is 
jurisdictional regardless of the holding in Irwin.123 In Ramming v. 
United States, the Fifth Circuit decided whether a bankruptcy court’s 
order “tolling all limitations periods for all other claims under 
applicable law” could toll plaintiff’s claim against the government 
under the FTCA.124 Rather than discussing Irwin’s presumption in 
favor of tolling such claims, the court simply applied its own 
precedent defining § 2401(b) as jurisdictional.125 The court held that 
because § 2401(b) was a jurisdictional bar, not even the bankruptcy 
court order could extend its limitations.126 Ramming could simply be 
bad law, insofar as it failed to apply Irwin; however, the Fifth Circuit 
recently cited it approvingly for the proposition that the FTCA 
limitations period is jurisdictional.127 
Having binding precedent that defines the FTCA statute of 
limitations as jurisdictional, while other circuits define the same 
statute as an affirmative defense, underscores the problem Sand & 
Gravel created. Lacking a definitive Supreme Court determination of 
the nature of the FTCA limitations periods, courts purporting to 
follow the holding in Sand & Gravel apply their own precedent and 
define the statute to either confirm or rebut the Irwin presumption.128 
Thus, depending on the precedent of the particular circuit, the 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 194–97 (3d Cir. 2009). In Santos, the Third 
Circuit recognized that it traditionally considered the FTCA limitations as jurisdictional. Id. at 194. 
After Irwin, the court reasoned, no federal statutes of limitations were jurisdictional because they were 
subject to “the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private 
defendants.” Id. (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990)). Thus, applying 
Irwin, the Third Circuit found that the FTCA limitations period was not jurisdictional. Id. at 194–95. 
 123. McGraw, 281 F.3d at 1001 (holding that § 2401(b) is a threshold jurisdictional issue); Ramming, 
281 F.3d at 165. 
 124. Ramming, 281 F.3d at 165. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig., 646 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 128. Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 194 (3d Cir. 2009). But see Marley v. United 
States, 567 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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limitations period for the FTCA is jurisdictional in one instance and 
not in another.129 
III. CLARIFYING SAND & GRAVEL TO ENSURE COURTS APPLY 
WAIVERS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THEIR STATUTES OF 
LIMITATIONS UNIFORMLY 
It is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court intended for circuits to 
apply statutes of limitations for federal waivers of sovereign 
immunity according to their own precedents. The Court would not 
intentionally have the same federal law applied inconsistently 
throughout the nation.130 Furthermore, because the Court could easily 
ascertain that, at the time it ruled on Sand & Gravel, circuits split on 
the nature of certain statutes of limitations,131 it must be the case that 
the Court did not intend the “prior definitive interpretation” language 
of Sand & Gravel to apply to mere circuit precedent. Support for this 
proposition comes directly from the language of the Court’s opinion 
in Sand & Gravel.132 When discussing the difference between the 
EEOC statute of limitations at issue in Irwin and the Court of Claims 
statute at issue in Sand & Gravel, the Court stated, “[The EEOC 
statute] is unlike the [the Court of Claims statute] in the key respect 
that the Court had not previously provided a definitive 
interpretation.”133 Of course, when Justice Breyer says “the Court,” 
he means the Supreme Court of the United States.134 
Nonetheless, some circuit courts take Sand & Gravel to mean that 
they may apply their own interpretations of statutes to rebut the Irwin 
presumption in favor of equitable tolling.135 The most glaring 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Compare Marley, 567 F.3d at 1035, and FEMA Trailer Litig., 646 F.3d at 190, with Santos, 559 
F.3d at 194. 
 130. Even the Court in Sand & Gravel recognized that at times it is more important to have the law 
settled than settled correctly. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008) 
(citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 131. Compare Marley, 567 F.3d at 1035–36, with Santos, 559 F.3d at 196–97. 
 132. Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. at 137. 
 133. Id. (emphasis added). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See, e.g., Santos, 559 F.3d at 197 (“We think that our holding in Hughes that there can be 
equitable tolling in suits under the FTCA remains good law . . . .”) (emphasis added); Marley, 567 F.3d 
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example of a circuit court applying its own precedent under the guise 
of Sand & Gravel is the Ninth Circuit decision in Marley v. United 
States.136 In Marley, the court properly stated that the Sand & Gravel 
Court rejected the contention that the Irwin presumption would last 
notwithstanding a prior definitive interpretation by the Court.137 
Without first explaining how this holding applied to circuit court 
precedent as well, however, the Marley court then stated, “[w]e, too, 
can find the answer in our own precedent. We have long held that 
§ 2401(b) is jurisdictional.”138 Of course, other circuits have long 
held that § 2401(b) is not jurisdictional.139 So, how might the 
Supreme Court act so as to achieve standardized application of 
federal waivers of sovereign immunity? Three plausible 
contingencies exist. 
A. Options Available To The Supreme Court 
1. Reversal of Sand & Gravel 
If a case arises where a plaintiff seeks to toll the limitations period 
for a statute previously defined by the Supreme Court as 
jurisdictional, the Court could take the opportunity to reverse Sand & 
Gravel Co. by explicitly holding that a prior definitive interpretation 
of a statute may not rebut the presumption of equitable tolling.140 In 
                                                                                                                 
at 1035. 
 136. Marley, 567 F.3d at 1035. 
 137. Id. The Ninth Circuit summarized Sand & Gravel by stating that the Supreme Court rejected the 
Sand & Gravel plaintiff’s argument, and “that [Irwin] . . . applied when the Court’s past cases already 
had established a rule dealing with the particular statute at hand.” Id. (citing Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. at 
135–37). 
 138. Id. (emphasis added). 
 139. Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639, 640 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 140. An argument for reversing Sand & Gravel is more likely to be successful if presented in terms of 
the Court misconstruing Acts of Congress. Canada Packers, Ltd. v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. 
Co., 385 U.S. 182, 185–86 & n.2 (1966) (“We have not been reluctant to reverse our own erroneous 
interpretation of an Act of Congress.”). The argument would be that, insofar as Sand & Gravel treats 
some statues of limitations as jurisdictional and others as affirmative defenses, the case misapplies the 
implicit intent of Congress to have the limitations act as affirmative defenses in all waivers of sovereign 
immunity. 
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so doing, the Court would reinstate the Irwin presumption in favor of 
equitable tolling for all waivers sovereign immunity.141 
Even though overruling Sand & Gravel is possible, it is not a 
perfect solution. Even if Sand & Gravel were overruled and the Irwin 
presumption applied to a given statute, the determination of whether 
equitable tolling applied to a particular waiver of sovereign immunity 
would continue to be ad hoc.142 A presumption in favor of equitable 
tolling necessarily means that the government has the opportunity to 
rebut that presumption.143 The government could simply argue that 
the plain language and legislative history of the particular statute 
evince congressional intent not to toll the limitations period.144 Such 
a theory would require the Court to analyze the statute to determine if 
congressional intent rebuts the presumption of equitable tolling.145 
Thus, courts would be faced with determining, in each instance, if the 
particular statute’s language and history rebut the Irwin presumption. 
Freeing the courts from such ad hoc analysis was the main driving 
force in the Irwin holding.146 
2. Clarification of Sand & Gravel 
Another solution might be for the Supreme Court to clarify Sand & 
Gravel so that circuits understand it to mean that Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 141. If the Court chose to simply reverse Sand & Gravel, it would merely hold that the Government 
could not rebut the Irwin presumption with a definitive earlier interpretation of the statute by the 
Supreme Court. Such a holding, however, leaves available other opportunities for rebutting the 
presumption. 
 142. See infra p. 62 and note 153. 
 143. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 137 (2008) (“[T]he word ‘rebuttable’ 
means that the presumption is not conclusive.”). 
 144. For example, in United States v. Brockamp the Court faced the issue of determining whether it 
may toll the statutory time period for filing tax refund claims in accordance with § 6511 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 348 (1997). The Government apparently argued that 
although the Irwin presumption applied to all waivers of sovereign immunity, the language of § 6511 
rebutted that presumption. See id. at 350–51. 
 145. The Brockamp Court ultimately adopted the argument that § 6511 was not subject to equitable 
tolling. Id. at 354. Such a finding, however, required the Court to perform an individual statutory 
analysis of § 6511. Id. at 350–54. Thus, even though the Irwin presumption applied to the statute, the 
Court still performed an ad hoc analysis of the statute. See id. 
 146. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (“Thus a continuing effort on our part 
to decide each case on an ad hoc basis, as we appear to have done in the past, would have the 
disadvantage of continuing unpredictability without the corresponding advantage of greater fidelity to 
the intent of Congress.”). 
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precedent alone is the relevant precedent in determining whether the 
Irwin presumption is rebutted.147 Accordingly, circuit courts could 
not look to their own definitions of a statute in the absence of a 
Supreme Court definition, and the Irwin presumption would apply 
uniformly for all those statutes that the Court has yet to interpret. 
Unfortunately, because the Irwin presumption itself is susceptible to 
case-by-case determinations, this remedy would also result in a return 
to ad hoc analysis, just like a reversal of Sand & Gravel would. In 
general, the ad hoc problem arises from Irwin. There, the Court failed 
to adequately eliminate the threat of ad hoc analysis when 
determining whether to equitably toll a particular waiver of sovereign 
immunity.148 As discussed above, under Irwin, government-
defendants will argue that language of a particular statute rebuts the 
Irwin presumption, requiring courts to analyze each statute on a case-
by-case basis—a result the Irwin Court itself sought to avoid.149 
3. A Workable Solution: Strengthening Sand & Gravel 
To truly extinguish ad hoc analysis of a particular statute’s 
susceptibility to equitable tolling while facilitating consistent 
application of the law, the Supreme Court should take Sand & Gravel 
one step further by holding that all waivers of sovereign immunity 
are presumptively subject to equitable tolling and the only manner in 
which the Government may rebut that presumption is by showing 
either: (1) express language in the statute defining the limitation as 
jurisdictional; or (2) a prior determination by the Supreme Court to 
that effect. First and foremost, such a holding ensures continuity 
among circuits in their approach to equitably tolling federal waivers 
of sovereign immunity.150 Under this approach, if the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 147. To achieve this end the Court could simply clarify that when it said, “a definitive earlier 
interpretation of the statute . . . should offer a similarly sufficient rebuttal,” Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. at 
138, it meant an interpretation of the statute by the Supreme Court alone. 
 148. The failure of the Irwin holding is that it fails to define what suffices to rebut the presumption of 
equitable tolling. For waivers of sovereign immunity, therefore, the Court still must determine, on a 
statute-by-statute basis, if the language of the statute rebuts the presumption. 
 149. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 150. The key to this solution is limiting the grounds for defining a federal waiver of sovereign 
immunity’s statute of limitations as jurisdiction or as an affirmative defense to lawmakers and courts 
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fails to supply a definitive interpretation of a given statute and 
Congress likewise is silent in the text of the statute, all circuits would 
have to find the government powerless to rebut the presumption of 
equitable tolling. Any particular circuit’s own interpretation or 
analysis of the statute would be irrelevant since equitable tolling 
absolutely applies to the statute except in situations where the 
Supreme Court or Congress has expressly deemed otherwise.151 
Limiting the grounds for rebutting the Irwin presumption to 
Supreme Court precedent and the express language of the statute at 
issue promotes consistency. When Congress waives the United 
States’ sovereign immunity, that waiver applies throughout the 
nation. Under the FTCA, for example, the federal government’s 
immunity from tort liability applies, or should apply, the same in all 
parts of the country. Private parties should feel confident that no 
matter their location within the United States, the government is 
liable for the torts it commits against them. Why should that 
confidence not inhere to the rules governing the period in which a 
plaintiff may bring a claim under the FTCA? If a presumption of 
equitable tolling applied to the FTCA uniformly in all circuits and the 
Government could only rebut that presumption with law that applies 
to the entire nation—Supreme Court precedent and the federal statute 
itself—the statute of limitations would operate in exactly the same 
manner regardless of where a plaintiff brings his claim.152 
                                                                                                                 
that preside over the entire nation, i.e., Congress and the Supreme Court. 
 151. In fact, there would no longer be circuit court interpretations of federal waivers of sovereign 
immunity. No reason would exist for the circuit court to interpret the statute. The court would simply 
look to the express language of the statute or Supreme Court case law. Such a result is necessary to 
achieve uniform application of federal law. 
 152. Application of this rule would, for instance, save plaintiffs like Ms. Alexander and her son 
Christopher Cooper (from the FEMA Trailer Litigation) considerable litigation expenses. With the 
proposed rule in place, Alexander would have known whether the FTCA statute of limitations could be 
tolled before ever bringing her claim. Instead, because a circuit split existed as to the ability to toll the 
FTCA limitations period, Alexander spent time and money arguing the issue before the court. Moreover, 
with the proposed rule in place, Alexander would likely have reached the merits of her case in the Fifth 
Circuit. Nothing in the FTCA expressly states that the limitations period is a jurisdictional bar. Further, 
the Supreme Court has never interpreted the FTCA limitations to be jurisdictional in nature. Therefore, 
the limitations period would be subject to equitable tolling in any given circuit. Finally, Alexander had a 
legitimate argument for tolling the FTCA limitations period based on the misleading statement given to 
her by a “government representative” concerning the safety of the FEMA trailers. See supra pp. 2–3 and 
note 6. 
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B. A Possible Problem: Statutes Where The Supreme Court Has Yet 
To Provide A Definitive Interpretation 
Under the aforementioned proposal some statutes that manifest a 
clear, although not express, intent to deny tolling of the limitations 
period may nonetheless have the limitations period tolled because the 
Supreme Court never ruled on the nature of the limitation on the 
particular statute.153 However, if Congress’s intention to deny tolling 
to a particular waiver of sovereign immunity is so palpable that 
applying tolling doctrine to the statute would clearly be erroneous, 
Congress should make that intention explicit. If it chose to do so, 
then under the proposed solution the Irwin presumption would give 
way to the language of the statute. If Congress fails to act on a 
particular statute, lack of Supreme Court precedent defining that 
statute should not give circuits the license to apply their own 
precedents. Rather, the presumption of equitable tolling should 
remain intact because no nationally applicable law exists to rebut it. 
CONCLUSION 
Generally, statutes of limitations for litigants are subject to a 
presumption of equitable tolling. This is not always the case, 
however, such as when the defendant is the federal government. 
More than a century ago, the Supreme Court ruled that statutes of 
limitations governing waivers of sovereign immunity are not 
susceptible to equitable considerations.154 The Court felt that because 
Congress alone held the power to prescribe the conditions of the 
government’s waiver of sovereign immunity, extending the period in 
which a plaintiff may bring a claim against the government exceeded 
the Court’s authority.155 More recently the Court took a different 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Section 6511 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 from Brockamp v. United States provides a 
useful example. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997). If the rule proposed by this Note had been in place 
before Brockamp reached the Supreme Court, lower courts would have tolled the limitations period of 
§ 6511 because no Supreme Court precedent had yet defined the statute as jurisdictional, and the statute 
itself does not do so either. See id. at 348. The proposed rule mandates this result even though the statute 
(according to the Court in Brockamp) clearly shows that it should not be equitably tolled. Id. 
 154. Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123, 125 (1883). 
 155. Id. at 125–26. 
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approach, holding that applying a presumption of equitable tolling to 
waivers of sovereign immunity did not extend the waiver beyond the 
intent of Congress.156 The Court reserved the ability for the 
Government to rebut the presumption, however.157 In Sand & Gravel, 
the Court held that a “definitive earlier interpretation” of the statute 
at issue as a jurisdictional bar could rebut the presumption announced 
in Irwin.158 
Some circuit courts interpret the holding in Sand & Gravel as 
allowing them to apply their own prior definitions of certain waivers 
of sovereign immunity.159 As may be expected, circuits have 
conflicting definitions of some of those statutes of limitations. Thus, 
certain circuits allow themselves to toll a particular federal statute of 
limitations while others deny themselves that power over the same 
statute. 
The Supreme Court should clarify and strengthen the holding in 
Sand & Gravel by holding that, in the absence of express language in 
the statute defining the limitations period as jurisdictional, only a 
“prior definitive interpretation” by the Supreme Court may rebut the 
presumption in favor of equitably tolling limitations periods in 
waivers of sovereign immunity. Under such a regime, all statutes of 
limitations for waivers of sovereign immunity would apply uniformly 
throughout the circuits. 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990). 
 157. Id. at 95–96. 
 158. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 137–38 (2008). 
 159. Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009); Marley v. United States, 
567 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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